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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he secret of successful retailing is to give your 
customers what they want.”  Sam Walton, SAM WALTON: 
MADE IN AMERICA 173 (1993).  This case involves one 
shareholder’s attempt to affect how Wal-Mart goes about 
doing that.   
Appellant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the world’s largest 
retailer, and one of its shareholders, Appellee Trinity Wall 
Street—an Episcopal parish headquartered in New York City 
that owns Wal-Mart stock—are locked in a heated dispute.  It 
stems from Wal-Mart’s rejection of Trinity’s request to 
include its shareholder proposal in Wal-Mart’s proxy 
materials for shareholder consideration.    
Trinity’s proposal, while linked to Wal-Mart’s sale of 
high-capacity firearms (guns that can accept more than ten 
rounds of ammunition) at about one-third of its 3,000 stores, 
is nonetheless broad.  It asks Wal-Mart’s Board of Directors 
to develop and implement standards for management to use in 
9 
 
deciding whether to sell a product that (1) “especially 
endangers public safety”; (2) “has the substantial potential to 
impair the reputation of Wal-Mart”; and/or (3) “would 
reasonably be considered by many offensive to the family and 
community values integral to the Company’s promotion of its 
brand.”  Standing in Trinity’s way, among other things, is a 
rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or 
“Commission”), known as the “ordinary business” exclusion.  
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (“Rule 14a-8(i)(7)”).  As its name 
suggests, the rule lets a company omit a shareholder proposal 
from its proxy materials if the proposal relates to its ordinary 
business operations. 
Wal-Mart obtained what is known as a “no-action 
letter” from the staff of the SEC’s Division of Corporate 
Finance (the “Corp. Fin. staff” or “staff”), thus signaling that 
there would be no recommendation of an enforcement action 
against the company if it omitted the proposal from its proxy 
materials.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2014 WL 409085, at *1 (Mar. 20, 2014).  Trinity thereafter 
filed suit in federal court, seeking to enjoin Wal-Mart’s 
exclusion of the proposal.  See Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 14-405-LPS, 2014 
WL 6790928 (D. Del. Nov. 26, 2014).  The core of the 
dispute is whether the proposal was excludable under the 
ordinary business exclusion.  Although the District Court 
initially denied Trinity’s request, it handed the church a 
victory on the merits some seven months later by holding 
that, because the proposal concerned the company’s Board 
(rather than its management) and focused principally on 
governance (rather than how Wal-Mart decides what to sell), 
it was outside Wal-Mart’s ordinary business operations.  Wal-
Mart appeals, seeking a ruling that it could exclude Trinity’s 
proposal from its 2015 proxy materials and did not err in 
excluding the proposal from its 2014 proxy materials. 
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Stripped to its essence, Trinity’s proposal—although 
styled as promoting improved governance—goes to the heart 
of Wal-Mart’s business: what it sells on its shelves.  For the 
reasons that follow, we hold that it is excludable under Rule 
14a-8(i)(7) and reverse the ruling of the District Court.1       
II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Public companies publish and circulate a proxy 
statement in advance of their annual shareholders’ meeting.  
The statement “includes information about items or initiatives 
on which the shareholders are asked to vote[.]”  Apache Corp. 
v. Chevedden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727 (S.D. Tex. 2010) 
(citation omitted).  It can also include shareholder 
proposals—a device that allows shareholders to ask for a vote 
on company matters.  Predictably, companies don’t easily 
surrender control of their proxy statement and often lean on 
an SEC rule to justify excluding a given shareholder proposal.  
But doing so can trigger a protracted legal battle that escalates 
from an exchange of views before the SEC to a federal 
lawsuit.  This is one such case.    
A. Trinity Objects to Wal-Mart’s Sale of Assault 
Rifles. 
Trinity’s roots extend back centuries.  Its St. Paul’s 
Chapel is the oldest public building in continuous use in New 
York City and is where George Washington worshipped after 
his first inauguration.  In 1705, the church was the beneficiary 
of the lower Manhattan farm of Queen Anne of England, 
instantly making it very wealthy.   
                                              
1  Because of the time-sensitive nature of this appeal, we were 
unable to give a full rationale for a ruling on the date we 
entered judgment in favor of Wal-Mart.  This opinion does 
so.      
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The story isn’t much different today.  Trinity continues 
to be one of the wealthiest religious institutions in the United 
States, with a balance sheet of over $800 million in assets and 
real estate valued at approximately $3 billion.  See Letter 
from Trinity Wall Street CFO Accompanying Trinity’s 2013 
Financial Statements (undated), available at 
https://www.trinitywallstreet.org/sites/default/files/miscellane
ous/LetterfromtheCFOaccompanyingthe2013FinancialStatem
ents.pdf.  Its strong financial footing, according to Trinity, 
empowers it to “pursue a mission of good works beyond the 
reach of other religious institutions.”  Trinity Br. 16.  Part of 
that mission is to reduce violence in society. 
Alarmed by the spate of mass murders in America, in 
particular the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 
December 2012, Trinity resolved to use its investment 
portfolio to address the ease of access to rifles equipped with 
high-capacity magazines (the weapon of choice of the Sandy 
Hook shooter and other mass murderers).  Its principal focus 
was Wal-Mart.  
During its review of Wal-Mart’s merchandising 
practices, Trinity discovered what it perceived as a major 
inconsistency.  Despite the retailer’s stated mission to “make 
a difference on the big issues that matter to us all,” Trinity Br. 
11, it continued in some states to sell the Bushmaster AR-15 
(a model of assault rifle).  Trinity also perceived Wal-Mart as 
taking an unprincipled approach in deciding which products 
to sell.  For example, despite its position on the AR-15, Wal-
Mart does not sell adult-rated movie titles (i.e., those rated 
NC-17) or similarly rated video or computer games.  Nor 
does it sell to children under 17 “‘R’ rated movies or ‘Mature’ 
rated video games.”  Trinity Br. 12.  Wal-Mart also doesn’t 
sell “music bearing a ‘Parental Advisory Label’” because of 
concerns about the music containing “strong language or 
depictions of violence, sex, or substance abuse.”  Id.  And 
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apparently due to safety concerns, it has stopped selling (1) 
handguns in the United States; (2) high-capacity magazines 
separate from a gun; and (3) guns through its website.  Trinity 
Br. 13.  Trinity attributes these perceived inconsistencies to 
the “lack of written policies and Board oversight concerning 
its approach to products that could have momentous 
consequences for both society and corporate reputation and 
brand value[.]”  Trinity Br. 16.2     
B. Trinity’s Shareholder Proposal. 
Trinity pressed Wal-Mart to explain its continued sale 
of the Bushmaster AR-15.  Wal-Mart’s response was as 
follows: 
There are many viewpoints on this topic and 
many in our country remain engaged in the 
conversations about the sale and regulation of 
certain firearms.  In areas of the country 
where we sell firearms, we have a long 
standing commitment to do so safely and 
                                              
2  In its brief and again at oral argument, Wal-Mart answered 
Trinity’s characterization of its sales practices and referred us 
to its “Safe and Compliant Product Policy” and its “Product 
Safety and Compliance” division, which “administers 
programs to identify, mitigate, and monitor risks associated 
with general merchandise.”  Reply Br. 4.  Wal-Mart also 
noted that a Board Committee is already tasked with 
“reviewing the Company’s reputation with external 
constituencies and recommending to the Board any proposed 
changes to the Company’s policies, procedures, and programs 
as a result of such review.”  Id. (citing J.A. 47) (alterations 
omitted). 
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responsibly.  Over the years, we’ve been very 
purposeful about finding the right balance 
between serving hunters and sportsmen and 
ensuring that we sell firearms responsibly.  
Wal-Mart’s merchandising decisions are 
based on customer demand and we recognize 
that most hunters and sportsmen use firearms 
responsibly and wish to continue to do so . . . .  
While there are some like you, Rev. Cooper, 
who ask us to stop selling firearms, there are 
many customers who ask us to continue to sell 
these products in our stores. 
J.A. 255–56. 
Unmoved, Trinity drafted a shareholder proposal 
aimed at filling the governance gap it perceived.  The 
proposal, which is the subject of this appeal, 
provides:   
			Resolved: 
 
Stockholders request that the Board 
amend the Compensation, Nominating 
and Governance Committee charter . . . 
as follows: 
“27. Providing oversight concerning 
[and the public reporting of] the 
formulation and implementation of . . . 
policies and standards that determine 
whether or not the Company should 
sell a product that:  
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1) especially endangers public safety 
and well-being; 
2) has the substantial potential to 
impair the reputation of the Company; 
and/or 
3) would reasonably be considered by 
many offensive to the family and 
community values integral to the 
Company’s  promotion of its brand.” 
J.A. 268.  
 The narrative part of the proposal makes 
clear it is intended to cover Wal-Mart’s sale of 
certain firearms.  It provides that the  
 
oversight and reporting is intended to cover 
policies and standards that would be 
applicable to determining whether or not the 
company should sell guns equipped with 
magazines holding more than ten rounds of 
ammunition (“high capacity magazines”) 
and to balancing the benefits of selling such 
guns against the risks that these sales pose to 
the public and to the Company’s reputation 
and brand value. 
 
Id.  
 
The proposal also included a supporting statement 
asserting in relevant part that  
 
[t]he company respects family and community 
interests by choosing not to sell certain 
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products such as music that depicts violence 
or sex and high capacity magazines separately 
from a gun, but lacks policies and standards to 
ensure transparent and consistent 
merchandizing decisions across product 
categories.  This results in the company’s sale 
of products, such as guns equipped with high 
capacity magazines, that facilitate mass 
killings, even as it prohibits sales of passive 
products such as music that merely depict 
such violent rampages. 
 
. . . .              
 
While guns equipped with high capacity 
magazines are just one example of a product 
whose sale poses significant risks to the public 
and to the company’s reputation and brand, 
their sale illustrates a lack of reasonable 
consistency that this proposal seeks to address 
through Board level oversight.  This 
responsibility seems appropriate for the 
Compensation, Nominating and Governance 
Committee, which is charged with related 
responsibilities.  
 
J.A. 268–69.3   
                                              
3  In this context, the proposal is similar to that of a 
shareholder proposal submitted to Wal-Mart in December 
2000 to halt its sale of “handguns and their accompanying 
ammunition, in any way (e.g.[,] by special order).”  Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 253625, at *1 
(Mar. 9, 2001).  Like Trinity, the submitting shareholder 
maintained that it was “inappropriate for a ‘family store’ to 
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The purpose of the proposal, as explained by 
the Reverend James H. Cooper, Trinity’s Rector, is 
to 
allow[] the company to make a transparent 
choice considering both the business and 
ethical (community impact) aspects of the 
matter.  Anti-violence concerns can be 
broadly considered, including for example the 
sale of video games glorifying violence, as 
well as other merchandising decisions that are 
inconsistent with the well-being of the 
community and/or Wal-Mart’s brand value 
and desired reputation.   
Trinity Br. 18–19 (citation omitted).   
C. Wal-Mart Seeks a No-Action Letter from the SEC.4 
On January 30, 2014, Wal-Mart notified Trinity and 
the Corp. Fin. staff of its belief that it could exclude the 
                                                                                                     
sell handguns in any way.”  Id. at *4.  As here, the Corp. Fin. 
staff issued a no-action letter allowing Wal-Mart to exclude 
the proposal from its proxy materials because it related to its 
“ordinary business operations (i.e., the sale of a particular 
product).”  Id. at *6.        
4  In the words of the SEC, a “no-action letter is one in which 
an authorized staff official indicates that the staff will not 
recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if the 
proposed transaction described in the incoming 
correspondence is consummated.”  Procedures Utilized by the 
Division of Corporate Finance for Rendering Informal 
Advice, Release No. 6,253, 1980 WL 25632, at *1 n.2 (Oct. 
28, 1980).         
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proposal from its 2014 proxy materials under Rule 14a-
8(i)(7).  Trinity predictably disagreed, stating that its proposal 
didn’t “meddl[e] in ordinary course decision-making” but 
focused on “big picture oversight and supervision that is the 
responsibility of the Board.”  J.A. 280.  In support of that 
assertion, Trinity offered three reasons why its proposal was 
not excludable: 
1. [it] addresses corporate governance 
through Board oversight of important 
merchandising policies and is 
substantially removed from 
particularized decision-making in the 
ordinary course of business; 
2. [it] concerns the Company’s standards 
for avoiding community harm while 
fostering public safety and corporate 
ethics and does not relate exclusively 
to any individual product; and 
3. [it] raises substantial issues of public 
policy, namely a concern for the safety 
and welfare of the communities served 
by the Company’s stores. 
J.A. 280.  Trinity also touted the proposal as: not dictating 
“the specifics of how that Board oversight will operate or 
how best to report publically on the policies being followed 
by the Company and their implementation,” J.A. 281; not 
seeking to “determine what products should or should not be 
sold by the Company,” id.; allowing policy development “not 
by shareholders, but by management, using its knowledge and 
discretion,” id.; and addressing “the ethical responsibility of 
the Company to take account of public safety and well-being, 
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and the related risks of damage to the Company’s reputation 
and brand,” J.A. 283. 
On March 20, 2014, the Commission’s Corp. Fin. staff 
issued a “no-action” letter siding with Wal-Mart.  It noted that 
“there appears to be some basis for [Wal-Mart’s] view that 
[it] may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(7), as 
relating to [its] ordinary business operations[,]” because 
“[p]roposals concerning the sale of particular products and 
services are generally excludable under [the rule].”  Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 409085, at *1 
(Mar. 20, 2014).  Consequently, the staff would “not 
recommend enforcement action to the Commission if 
Walmart [sic] omits the proposal from its proxy materials in 
reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(7).”  Id.   
Because no-action letters are not binding—they reflect 
only informal views of the staff and are not decisions on the 
merits—Trinity’s proposal still had life.  
D. Trinity Takes its Fight to Federal Court: Round 
One. 
On April 1, 2014, and just 17 days before Wal-Mart’s 
proxy materials were due at the printer, Trinity filed a 
declaratory judgment action against Wal-Mart in the District 
of Delaware.  It sought a declaration that “Wal-Mart’s 
decision to omit the proposal from [its] 2014 Proxy Materials 
violates Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-8.”  
Trinity, 2014 WL 6790928, at *2 (internal citation omitted).  
The relief it requested was twofold: 
 
1. A permanent injunction to prevent 
Wal-Mart from excluding its proposal 
from its 2015 proxy materials; and 
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2. A preliminary injunction to prevent it 
from printing, issuing, filing, mailing 
or otherwise transmitting proxy 
materials in connection with its 2014 
Annual Meeting that do not contain the 
shareholder proposal submitted by 
Trinity.  
 
Id.  
 
Because of the April 17 deadline, the District Court 
held an emergency hearing on Trinity’s preliminary 
injunction request.  At the hearing the Court described 
Trinity’s burden as “heavy,” the remedy it was seeking as 
“extraordinary,” and the time frame within which it had to 
rule as “highly expedited.”  Id.  It didn’t help Trinity’s cause 
that the SEC had already sided with Wal-Mart.   
 
It’s very clear that the SEC has had 
hundreds of opportunities to consider 
questions like this.  I have not.  While the 
SEC may only have a few hours or whatever 
to put into each of these, I have roughly the 
same amount of time. You come to what 
you know is an extremely busy court. We 
have given this expedited attention. It comes 
to us with a no action conclusion from the 
SEC staff . . . You come to me, you have the 
burden [of] asking for extraordinary relief, 
and I need to find that it’s likely that at the 
end of the trial, whenever we get there, I’m 
going to disagree with the SEC staff. 
 
Id. at *3 (brackets omitted). 
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Viewing the proposal as one dealing “with guns on the 
shelves and not guns in society,” the Court, in a ruling from 
the bench, held that the proposal related to an “ordinary 
business matter” and was thus excludable under Rule 14a-
8(i)(7).  Id.  It explained that 
 
[t]he proposal [] expressly and . . . 
importantly states that the requested 
“oversight and/or reporting is intended to 
cover policies and standards that would be 
applicable [to] determining whether or not 
the company should sell guns equipped with 
magazines holding more than 10 rounds of 
ammunitions, high capacity magazines.” 
And I tried to emphasize it’s my added 
emphasis on “sell.” 
 
. . . . 
 
While the specific proposal is crafted as one 
directed solely to policy and oversight and 
therefore arguably arises in the difficult and 
seemingly novel perhaps intersection 
between ordinary business . . . on the [one] 
hand [and corporate governance] on the 
other hand, ultimately I’m not persuaded 
that I’m likely to conclude at the end of the 
day on the merits that it therefore does not 
fall within the exception given the rule for 
ordinary business. 
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Id. (emphases omitted).  The Court also gave weight to the 
SEC’s “expertise” and “lengthy experience” involving proxy 
contests.  Id.5     
 
Although the favorable ruling allowed Wal-Mart to 
exclude Trinity’s proposal from its 2014 proxy materials, it 
had not yet prevailed on the merits. 
E. Round Two.  
Wal-Mart thereafter moved to dismiss both counts of 
Trinity’s amended complaint.  It contended that Trinity’s 
challenge to Wal-Mart’s exclusion of the proposal from the 
retailer’s 2014 proxy materials (count 1) was moot, see id. at 
*4, and the challenge to Wal-Mart’s “reasonably anticipated 
2015 violation of Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-8” (count 2) 
wasn’t ripe, id. at *5 (emphasis added).  The District Court 
granted Wal-Mart’s motion only in part.  It disagreed on 
mootness, but agreed on ripeness.  Most notably, however, 
and in direct tension with its earlier decision, the Court on 
summary judgment held that the proposal was not excludable 
under Rule 14a-8(i)(7). 
With more time to deliberate, the Court concluded 
that, although the proposal “could (and almost certainly 
would) shape what products are sold by Wal-Mart,” it is “best 
viewed as dealing with matters that are not related to Wal-
Mart’s ordinary business operations.”  Id. at *8 (emphasis 
added).  Thus Rule 14(a)-8 could not block its inclusion in 
Wal-Mart’s proxy materials.  The Court fastened its holding 
                                              
5  To be sure, the Court did not suggest that staff no-action 
letters get automatic deference; just that “under the 
circumstances, . . . some deference [was] merited.”  J.A. 110 
(emphasis added). 
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to the view that the proposal wasn’t a directive to 
management but to the Board to “oversee the development 
and effectuation of a Wal-Mart policy.”  Id. at *9.  In this 
way, “[a]ny direct impact of adoption of Trinity’s proposal 
would be felt at the Board level; it would then be for [it] to 
determine what, if any, policy should be formulated and 
implemented.”  Id.   Stated differently, the day-to-day 
responsibility for implementing whatever policies the Board 
develops was outside the scope of the proposal.       
 In the alternative, the Court held that even if the 
proposal does tread on the core of Wal-Mart’s business—the 
products it sells—it “nonetheless ‘focuses on sufficiently 
significant social policy issues’” that “transcend[] the day-to-
day business matters”  of the company, making the proposal 
“appropriate for a shareholder vote.”  Id. at *9 (brackets & 
emphasis omitted).  Among the policy issues the District 
Court noted are “the social and community effects of sales of 
high capacity firearms at the world’s largest retailer and the 
impact this could have on Wal-Mart’s reputation, particularly 
if such a product sold at Wal-Mart is misused and people are 
injured or killed as a result.”  Id. 
The Court also found helpful how “Trinity [] carefully 
drafted its proposal . . . to not dictate what products should be 
sold or how the policies regarding sales of certain types of 
products should be formulated or implemented.”  Id. at *10.  
It stressed the difference between Trinity’s proposal and the 
generally excludable proposals that ask a company to report 
on its “policies and reporting obligations regarding possible 
toxic and hazardous products offered for sale.”  See id. 
(“Each of these proposals requested policies or information—
such as information on the companies’ efforts to minimize 
exposure to toxic substances, attempts by the companies to 
secure supply chains, options for alternative safer products, 
and encouraging suppliers to reduce or eliminate harmful 
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substances—which directly impacted the ordinary business 
operations of the companies involved far more than Trinity’s 
proposal would directly impact Wal-Mart.”).6 
Finally, the District Court addressed Wal-Mart’s 
secondary argument that Trinity’s proposal is excludable 
under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) for being “so inherently vague or 
                                              
6  As to Wal-Mart’s reliance on the Corp. Fin. staff’s grant of 
its no-action request, “a factor to which the Court [] accorded 
significant weight at the preliminary injunction stage,” it 
declined to accord the staff’s action any weight because “[i]t 
is undisputed that the final determination as to the 
applicability of the ordinary business exception is for the 
Court alone to make.”  Id. (citation omitted).  It also 
explained the shift from its earlier ruling:   
 
At that earlier time Trinity was seeking 
“extraordinary relief” and the Court’s analysis 
was . . . rushed as well as truncated.  In fact, a 
mere ten days passed between the filing of the 
motion and the oral argument and the Court’s 
ruling on it.  Under the tight time constraints, 
the Court did not even permit full briefing on 
the preliminary injunction motion.  As . . . 
noted at that time, “one hopes that if the case 
proceeds, I’ll at least have more time to reflect 
further on the argument.”  Having now had 
the benefit of that time for reflection, as well 
as the invaluable assistance of additional 
briefing and oral argument, the Court sees the 
issues in the way it has explained here.     
 
Id. at *11. 
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indefinite that neither the stockholders voting on the proposal, 
nor the company in implementing the proposal (if adopted), 
would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty 
exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires.”  Id. 
at *11 (quoting SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B, 2004 WL 
3711971, at *4 (Sept. 15, 2004)).  It acknowledged that “Wal-
Mart is undoubtedly correct that the ‘broad variety of 
products offered by [it] and the numerous customers, 
employees and communities around the world with whom [it] 
works’ mean that ‘there is no single set of ‘family and 
community values’ that would be readily identifiable as being 
‘integral to the company’s promotion of its brand.’”  Id. 
(emphasis in original, bold omitted).  But it doesn’t “follow 
from this that shareholders voting on the proposal, or the 
Committee in implementing it (if approved), would be unable 
to determine with reasonable certainty what the Committee 
needs to do.”  Id.  “Instead, it merely illustrates . . . that the 
[p]roposal properly leaves the details of any policy 
formulation and implementation to the discretion of the 
Committee, showing once more that [it] does not dictate any 
particular outcome or micro-manage Wal-Mart’s day-to-day 
business.”  Id.   
Wal-Mart appeals from both of the Court’s holdings 
on the merits. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Trinity’s request to enjoin Wal-Mart from 
excluding the proposal from its 2015 proxy materials is ripe, 
as Trinity resubmitted its proposal for inclusion in Wal-
Mart’s 2015 proxy materials and Wal-Mart again rebuffed its 
request.  We review the District Court’s order granting 
Trinity’s motion for summary judgment de novo.  As it did 
below, Wal-Mart bears the burden of establishing as a matter 
of law that it properly excluded the proposal under an 
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exception to Rule 14a-8.  See AFSCME v. Am. Int’l Grp., 
Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2006). 
III. REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
A. The Proxy Statement 
A shareholder that is unable to attend a company’s 
annual meeting isn’t disenfranchised.  It can vote its shares by 
proxy by empowering an attending shareholder to do so on its 
behalf.  Vote by proxy has “become an indispensable part of 
corporate governance because the ‘realities of modern 
corporate life have all but gutted the myth that shareholders in 
large publicly held companies personally attend annual 
meetings.’”  Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (brackets omitted) (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 
75, 86 (Del. 1992)); see also Proposed Amendments to Rule 
14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, 1982 WL 600869, 
at *2 (Oct. 14, 1982) (“1982 Proposing Release”) (noting that 
“with the increased dispersion of security holdings in public 
companies, the proxy solicitation process rather than the 
shareholder’s meeting itself [] [became] the forum for 
shareholder suffrage”). 
As discussed above, a public company that solicits 
proxies must distribute a proxy statement to each of its 
shareholders in advance of the annual shareholder meeting.  
The statement is an informational package that tells 
shareholders “about items or initiatives on which [they] are 
asked to vote, such as proposed bylaw amendments, 
compensation or pension plans, or the issuance of new 
securities.” Apache Corp., 696 F. Supp. at 727 (citation 
omitted).  “The proxy card, on which the shareholder may 
submit its proxy, and the proxy statement together are the 
‘proxy materials.’”  Id.  (citing 17 C.F.R. § 2401.14a-8(j)). 
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B. Proxy Solicitation 
Through its proxy materials, a company solicits 
proxies—hence the term “proxy solicitation.”  Congress, 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, gave the SEC 
oversight of the proxy context.  See 3 Thomas Lee Hazen, 
Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 10.1[1] (6th 
ed. 2009) (describing the 1934 Act as a congressional 
response to the uptick of “great corporate frauds [that] had 
been perpetrated through management solicitation of proxies 
that did not indicate to the shareholders the nature of any 
matters to be voted upon”).  “Section [] 14(a) of the [1934 
Act] renders unlawful the solicitation of proxies in violation 
of the SEC’s rules and regulations, which are codified at 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 et seq.”  Amalgamated Clothing & Textile 
Workers Union, 821 F. Supp. at 881; see also J.I. Case v. 
Borak Co., 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (“The purpose of 
§ 14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining 
authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or 
inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation.”). 
The SEC’s “proxy rules are concerned with assuring 
full disclosure to investors of matters likely to be considered 
at shareholder meetings.”  Hazen at § 10.2[1].  To that end, 
the SEC adopted “Rule 14a-9, which prohibits ‘false or 
misleading’ statements made in any proxy statement, form of 
proxy, notice of meeting or other communication.”  
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 821 F. 
Supp. at 882 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a)).  It has 
interpreted the rule to “require companies to provide 
shareholders with the opportunity to submit proposals to 
management for inclusion in the corporation’s proxy 
materials.”  Id. 
To complement Rule 14a-9, the Commission 
promulgated Rule 14a-8 “to catalyze what many hoped would 
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be a functional ‘corporate democracy.’”  Alan R. Palmiter, 
The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in 
Merit Regulation, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 879, 879 (1994).  The rule 
mandates subsidized shareholder access to a company’s proxy 
materials, requiring “reporting companies . . . to print and 
mail with management’s proxy statement, and to place on 
management’s proxy ballot, any ‘proper’ proposal submitted 
by a qualifying shareholder.”  Id. at 886; cf. Roosevelt v. E.I. 
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 421 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.) (maintaining that Rule 14a-8’s 
“right to be informed” is complementary to but distinct from 
Rule 14a-9’s “ban on misleading statements in proxy 
solicitations”).  The idea was to provide shareholders a way to 
“bring before their fellow stockholders matters of 
[shareholder concern]” that are “proper subjects for 
stockholders’ action under the laws of the state under which 
[the Company] was organized,” 1982 Proposing Release, 
1982 WL 600869, at *3, and to “have proxies with respect to 
such proposals solicited at little or no expense to the security 
holder,” id. at *2. 
C. Shareholder Proposals 
A primary means to urge corporate reform is the 
shareholder proposal, which “communicate[s] not only 
[shareholders’] interest[] in a company’s financial 
performance, but also their interests and preferences 
concerning a wide range of issues, such as the board’s 
structure and oversight of important policies, sustainability, 
and ethical performance.”  Brief of amici curiae Corporate 
and Securities Law Professors 2.  The hard part, however, is 
soliciting votes to pass a proposal—especially where the 
motivation is to raise awareness of a policy issue.  See James 
R. Copeland, Getting the Politics Out of Proxy Season, Wall 
St. J., A11 (Apr. 23, 2015) (“Not one of the 1,150 shareholder 
proposals concerning social or policy issues since 2006 got 
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the support of a majority of voting shareholders over board 
opposition.”).   
A shareholder can garner support in one of two ways.  
It can “pay to issue a separate proxy statement, which must 
satisfy all the disclosure requirements applicable to 
management’s proxy statement.”  Apache Corp., 696 F. Supp. 
2d at 727 (citation omitted).  Or the shareholder can go the 
Rule 14a-8 route and have the company include its proposal 
(and a supporting statement) in the proxy materials at the 
company’s expense.  See id. at 728.      
D. Exclusion of Shareholder Proposals 
Though the Rule 14a-8 option is financially 
advantageous, it does not “create an open forum for 
shareholder communication.”  Palmiter at 886.  Rule 14a-8 
restricts the company-subsidy to “shareholders who offer 
‘proper’ proposals.”  Id. at 879; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8 (“This section addresses when a company must include a 
shareholder’s proposal in its proxy statement and identify the 
proposal in its form of proxy when the company holds an 
annual or special meeting of shareholders.”).  A “proper” 
proposal is one that doesn’t fit within one of Rule 14a-8’s 
exclusionary grounds—which are both substantive and 
procedural.  
The procedural exclusions of the rule “protect the 
solicitation process without regard to a proposal’s content[.]”  
Palmiter at 886.  For example, the proponent “must have 
continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of 
the company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal 
at the meeting for at least one year by the date [it] submit[s] 
the proposal.”  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1).  It can “submit 
no more than one proposal to a company for a particular 
shareholders’ meeting.”  Id. at § 240.14a-8(b)(2)(i).  And the 
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“proposal, including any accompanying supporting statement, 
may not exceed 500 words.”  Id. at § 240.14a-8(d).   
The rule’s substantive exclusions, by contrast, are “the 
most frequently used (and most litigated).”  Palmiter at 890.  
They include (1) the “proper subjects” exclusion, which exists 
“[i]f the proposal is not a proper subject for action by 
shareholders under the law of the jurisdiction of the 
company’s organization,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1); (2) the 
“false or misleading” exclusion, which allows companies to 
bar proposals that are too vague, id. at § 240.14a-8(i)(3); (3) 
the “substantially related” exclusion, which says that a 
proposal is excludable if it “relates to operations which 
account for less than 5 percent of the company’s total assets 
[and net earnings and gross sales] at the end of its most recent 
fiscal year . . . , and is not otherwise significantly related to 
the company’s business,” id. at § 240.14a-8(i)(5); and, most 
relevant for purposes of this opinion, (4) the “ordinary 
business” exclusion, which disallows a proposal that “deals 
with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business 
operations,” id. at § 240.14a-8(i)(7).  See Palmiter 890.            
If a company wants to invoke one of these grounds to 
exclude a proposal, the process is as follows.  First, it must 
notify the shareholder in writing of the problem with the 
proposal within 14 days of receiving it and inform the 
shareholder that it has 14 days to respond.  Id. at § 240.14a-
8(f)(1).  If the company finds the shareholder’s response 
unpersuasive and still wants to exclude the proposal, it then 
must file with the Corp. Fin. staff the reasons why it believes 
the proposal is excludable no later than 80 days before the 
company files its proxy materials with the SEC.  Id. at § 
240.14a-8(j)(1).  In this letter, the company may also ask the 
staff for a no-action letter to support the exclusion of a 
proposal.  See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on 
Regulatory Interpretation in S.E.C. No-Action Letters: 
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Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 Cornell L. 
Rev. 921, 939 (1998) (“Although Rule 14a-8 merely 
prescribes notification and filing requirements, virtually all 
companies that decide to omit a shareholder proposal seek a 
no-action letter in support of their decision.”).  If the 
shareholder wants to respond, it can file a submission noting 
why exclusion would be improper.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(k). 
The staff will respond in one of two ways: (1) with a 
no-action letter, specifying that the company may omit the 
shareholder proposal under the exclusion(s) it relied on; or (2) 
that it is “unable to concur” with the company.7  A 
shareholder dissatisfied with the staff’s response can, as 
Trinity did here, pursue its rights against the company in 
federal court.8 
                                              
7  “[B]efore the SEC staff makes a decision on Rule 14a-8 no-
action requests, there are at least three levels of attorney 
review by a ‘task force’ dedicated to reviewing Rule 14a-8 
no-action requests[.]”  See Wal-Mart Br. 37–38 (outlining 
layers of review); see also Apache Corp. v. New York City 
Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 621 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 n.3 (S.D. Tex. 
2008) (describing no-action review process) (citing Thomas 
P. Lenke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process, 42 Bus. Law. 
1019, 1027–28 (1987)).              
 
8  Although rare, the Commission itself may choose to review 
a no-action letter.  Even then, its determination would become 
a final order only if it “impose[d] an obligation, den[ied] a 
right or fix[ed] some legal relationship as a consummation of 
the administrative process.”  Amalgamated Clothing & 
Textile Workers Union v. S.E.C., 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 
1994) (citations & internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
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E. SEC Interpretive Releases on the “Ordinary 
Business” Exclusion 
The ordinary business exclusion has been called the 
“most perplexing” of all the 14a-8 bars.  See Daniel E. 
Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social 
Responsibility: The Need to Reform the Federal Proxy Rules 
on Shareholder Proposals, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 33, 94 (1997).  
This stems from the opaque term “ordinary business,” which 
is neither self-defining nor consistent in its meaning across 
different corporate contexts.  Neither the courts nor Congress 
have offered a corrective.  Rather, and “[f]rom the beginning, 
Rule 14a-8 jurisprudence—both in quality and quantity—has 
rested almost exclusively with the [SEC] . . . .”  Palmiter at 
880.  In both its role as umpire and rule-maker, the SEC has 
provided various iterations of formal interpretive guidance.9  
Because they inform our analysis, we discuss each in turn.     
                                                                                                     
Hazen, supra at §10.8[1][A][2] (noting that Commission 
review is appropriate only where it involves “matters of 
substantial importance and where the issues are novel or 
highly complex”).      
  
9  Each of the SEC’s interpretive releases was adopted after 
notice and comment and thus merits our deference.  As the 
Supreme Court has explained, “[j]ust as we defer to an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute when it 
issues regulations in the first instance, . . . the agency is 
entitled to further deference when it adopts a reasonable 
interpretation of the regulations it has put in force.”  Fed. 
Express v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008); see also 
Dep’t of Labor v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 54 F.3d 141, 147 
(3d Cir. 1995) (“We accord greater deference to an 
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1. The 1976 Proposing Release  
The Commission’s initial frustration with the ordinary 
business exclusion was management’s reliance on it to omit 
proposals “that involve matters of considerable importance to 
the issuer [i.e., the company] and its security holders.”  
Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security 
Holders, Release No. 9,343, 1976 WL 160410, at *7 (July 7, 
1976) (“1976 Proposing Release”).  It proposed two 
modifications to address this concern.  The first was a textual 
alteration to clarify that a proposal is excludable “only if it 
deals with a ‘routine, day-to-day matter relating to the 
conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer.’”  
Id. at *8.  (The rule’s then-extant language provided that a 
proposal was excludable if it consisted of a “recommendation 
or request that [] management take action on a matter relating 
to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the 
issuer.”  Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  The 
second was a new standard to distinguish “routine” 
(excludable) from “important” matters (not excludable).  See 
id. at *8.  In the SEC’s view, management teams generally 
handle “mundane matters” while boards of directors are 
responsible for high level decision-making.  It thus proposed 
the following standard: “Will it be necessary for the board of 
directors . . . to act on the matter involved in the proposal?”  
Id. If the answer was no, the proposal dealt with a routine 
business matter and was thus excludable.  See id.       
2. The 1976 Adopting Release 
Commenters attacked the textual modification and new 
standard as unworkable.  As to the new language, the 
                                                                                                     
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulations 
than to its interpretation of a statute.”) (citations omitted).         
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criticism was that many routine, day-to-day business matters 
“would necessarily deal with ordinary business matters of a 
complex nature that shareholders, as a group, would not be 
qualified to make an informed judgment on, due to their lack 
of business expertise and their lack of intimate knowledge of 
the issuer’s business.”  Adoption of Amendments Relating to 
Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 12, 999, 1976 
WL 160347, at *10 (Nov. 22, 1976) (“1976 Adopting 
Release”).  It also “would be difficult to administer because 
of the subjective judgments that necessarily would be 
required in interpreting it.”  Id.  Regarding the new standard, 
the Commission relented to the criticism that “board practices 
relating to the delegation of authority to management 
personnel vary greatly, and there would, therefore, be no 
consistency in applying such a standard.” Id. at *11; see also 
id. (“The potential lack of consistency of the proposed 
standard is a fatal drawback, in the Commission’s view.  And, 
since no other reasonable standard for making the requisite 
distinctions is readily apparent, the Commission believes that 
the provision would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
administer on a satisfactory basis.”).  It thus opted for a tweak 
of the text of the exclusion and offered fresh interpretive 
guidance.   
For the former, it deleted any reference to 
management; the exclusion thus read, much like it does now, 
that a proposal is excludable if it “deals with a matter relating 
to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the 
issuer.”  Id.  Regarding the new guidance, the SEC 
maintained that the exclusion should be “interpreted 
somewhat more flexibly than in the past” and reaffirmed that 
the term “ordinary business operations” has been wrongly 
interpreted to “include certain matters which have significant 
policy, economic or other implications inherent in them.  For 
instance, a proposal that a utility company not construct a 
nuclear power plant has in the past been [wrongly] 
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considered” to be excludable.  Id.  Therefore, “proposals of 
that nature, as well as others that have major implications, 
will in the future be considered beyond the realm of an 
issuer’s ordinary business operations.”  Id. 
3. The 1982 Proposing Release 
The SEC took a fresh look at the ordinary business 
exclusion in 1982 in reviewing the staff’s then-prevailing 
view on proposals that ask a company to (1) prepare a report 
to shareholders or (2) recommend that a special committee be 
formed to examine a particular area of its business.  See 1982 
Proposing Release, 1982 WL 600869, at *17.  The staff 
asserted that, as a category, such proposals were not 
excludable even if the subject matter of the report or 
examination involved an ordinary business matter because, in 
its view, a company doesn’t disseminate reports to 
shareholders or establish special committees as part of its 
ordinary business operations.  See id.   
The SEC agreed to address the objection launched by 
commenters that the staff’s “interpretation [] rais[es] form 
over substance.”  Id.  It thus proposed for consideration 
“whether it would be more appropriate to consider in each 
instance whether the type of information sought by the 
proposal involves the ordinary business operations of the 
issuer and to disregard whether a proposal requests the 
preparation and distribution of a report or the formation of a 
special committee.”  Id.      
4. The 1983 Adopting Release 
After notice and comment, the Commission formalized 
its adoption of the proposed “significant change in the staff’s 
interpretation” of the exclusion.  Amendments to Rule 14a-8 
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to 
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Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 20,091, 1983 WL 
33272, at *7 (Aug. 16, 1983) (“1983 Adopting Release”) 
(“Because [the staff’s] interpretation raises form over 
substance and renders the provisions of [the ordinary business 
exclusion] largely a nullity, the Commission has determined 
to adopt the interpretive change set forth in the Proposing 
Release.”).  It thus directed the staff to “consider whether the 
subject matter of a special report or the committee involves a 
matter of ordinary business; where it does, the proposal will 
be excludable.”  Id. 
5. The 1997 Proposing Release 
The SEC revisited the ordinary business exclusion in 
the late 1990s to tackle proposals “relating simultaneously to 
both an ‘ordinary business’ matter and a significant social 
policy issue.”  Amendments to Rules on Shareholder 
Proposals, Release No. 39,093, 1997 WL 578696, at *12 
(Sept. 18, 1997) (the “1997 Proposing Release”).  The 
interpretive snag was that the “fairly straightforward mission” 
of the rule was ill-suited to address contemporary social 
issues and “provided no guidance” on how to treat proposals 
raising such issues.  Id.  This difficulty showed itself when 
the staff allowed a company (Cracker Barrel Old Country 
Stores) to exclude a proposal that asked it to “prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”  New York 
City Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. S.E.C., 45 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1995).  
In handling the proposal, the staff espoused the view, which 
the Commissioners of the SEC deemed untenable, that 
employment-related proposals—regardless whether they raise 
a social issue—are categorically excludable.  See Cracker 
Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 
WL 289095, at *1 (Oct. 13, 1992) (“[T]he Division has 
determined that the fact that a shareholder proposal 
concerning a company’s employment policies and practices 
for the general workforce is tied to a social issue will no 
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longer be viewed as removing the proposal from the realm of 
ordinary business operations of the registrant.  Rather, 
determinations with respect to any such proposals are 
governed by the employment-based nature of the proposal.”).  
To end this practice, the SEC declared that “employment-
related proposals focusing on significant social policy issues 
could not automatically be excluded under the ‘ordinary 
business’ exclusion.”  1997 Proposing Release, 1997 WL 
578686, at *13.  And going forward, “the ‘bright line’ 
approach for employment-related proposals established by the 
Cracker Barrel position would be replaced by a case-by-case 
analysis that prevailed previously.”  Id. 
In a final note of guidance, the Commission 
summarized the two considerations that guide how to apply 
the ordinary business exclusion.  “The first relates to the 
subject matter of the proposal.  Certain tasks are so 
fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on a 
day-to-day basis that they could not, as a practical matter, be 
subject to direct shareholder oversight.”  Id. at *14.  
According to the SEC, examples of this “include the 
management of the workforce, such as the hiring, promotion, 
and termination of employees, decisions on production 
quality and quantity, and the retention of suppliers.”  Id.  Yet 
“proposals relating to such matters but focusing on significant 
social policy issues generally would not be considered to be 
excludable, because such issues typically fall outside the 
scope of management’s prerogative.”  Id.  “The second 
consideration relates to the degree to which the proposal 
seeks to ‘micro manage’ the company by probing too deeply 
into ‘matters of a complex nature that shareholders, as a 
group, would not be qualified to make an informed judgment 
on, due to their lack of business expertise and lack of intimate 
knowledge of the (company’s) business.’”  Id.  It comes into 
play where “the proposal seeks intricate detail, or seeks to 
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impose specific time-frames or methods for implementing 
complex policies.”  Id. 
6. The 1998 Adopting Release 
Yet again the SEC declined to modify the language of 
the rule, perhaps afraid to unleash unintended consequences.  
Although “the legal term-of-art ‘ordinary business’ might be 
confusing to some shareholders and companies,” it posited, 
the risk that practitioners “might misconstrue [a] revision[] as 
signaling an interpretive change” was too great to ignore.  
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 
23, 200, 1998 WL 254809, at *2 (May 21, 1998) (“1998 
Adopting Release”); see also id. (“Indeed, since the meaning 
of the phrase ‘ordinary business’ has been developed by the 
courts over the years through costly litigation and essentially 
has become a term-of-art in the proxy area, we recognize the 
possibility that the adoption of a new term could inject 
needless costs and other inefficiencies into the shareholder 
proposal process.”).  It elected simply to reverse the staff’s 
1992 Cracker Barrel no-action letter, thus “return[ing] to a 
case-by-case analytical approach,” id. at *4, and commented 
that 
[w]hile we acknowledge that there is no 
bright-line test to determine when 
employment-related shareholder proposals 
raising social issues fall within the scope of 
the “ordinary business” exclusion, the staff 
will make reasoned distinctions in deciding 
whether to furnish “no-action” relief. 
Although a few of the distinctions made in 
those cases may be somewhat tenuous, we 
believe that on the whole the benefit to 
shareholders and companies in providing 
guidance and informal resolutions will 
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outweigh the problematic aspects of the few 
decisions in the middle ground. 
Id.  It also reaffirmed that the term “ordinary business” 
continues to “refer[] to matters that are not necessarily 
‘ordinary’ in the common meaning of the word” and “is 
rooted in the corporate law concept providing management 
with flexibility in directing certain core matters involving the 
company’s business and operations.”  Id. at *2 (emphasis 
added). 
With that background, we move to the merits of Wal-
Mart’s appeal.   
IV. ANALYSIS 
The principal issue we address is whether Trinity’s 
proposal was excludable because it related to Wal-Mart’s 
ordinary business operations.  In doing so, we evaluate the 
District Court’s primary and alternative holdings.  To repeat, 
it held that Trinity’s proposal doesn’t meddle in the nuts-and-
bolts of Wal-Mart’s business because it was a directive to the 
Board (rather than management) to set standards to guide 
certain merchandising decisions.  And in the alternative the 
proposal is not excludable because it implicates a significant 
social policy—the sale of high-capacity firearms by the 
world’s largest retailer —that transcends Wal-Mart’s ordinary 
business.  In this case (and we agree with the Commission 
that our determination counsels a case-by-case inquiry) we 
conclude that the proposal is excludable under the ordinary 
business proviso and that the significant social policy 
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intended by the proposal is here no exception to that 
exclusion.10   
A. Trinity’s Proposal Relates to Wal-Mart’s Ordinary 
Business Operations.    
We employ a two-part analysis to determine whether 
Trinity’s proposal “deals with a matter relating to the 
company’s ordinary business operations[.]” 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8(i)(7).  Under the first step, we discern the 
“subject matter” of the proposal.  See 1983 Adopting Release, 
1983 WL 33272, at *7.  Under the second, we ask whether 
that subject matter relates to Wal-Mart’s ordinary business 
operations.  Id.  If the answer to the second question is yes, 
Wal-Mart must still convince us that Trinity’s proposal does 
not raise a significant policy issue that transcends the nuts and 
bolts of the retailer’s business.    
1. What is the subject matter of Trinity’s proposal? 
Beginning with the first step, we are mindful of the 
Commission’s consistent nod to substance over form and its 
distaste for clever drafting.  As it reaffirmed in the 1982 and 
1983 Releases, it matters little how a shareholder styles its 
proposal; the emphasis should always be on its substance.  To 
                                              
10  A majority of the members of this panel (Judges Shwartz 
and Vanaskie) also hold that the proposal (which Trinity 
declined to divide into separate parts) is excludable for being 
unduly vague under Rule 14a-8(i)(3).  I decline to join that 
holding.  Wal-Mart’s vagueness objection was first raised in 
the District Court and not before the SEC in seeking a no-
action letter.  And before us it devoted little attention to the 
argument.  I thus think it not prudent to reach the vagueness 
question in this instance.   
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illustrate its point, the SEC invoked the staff’s disparate 
treatment of two proposals where the Commission thought 
the outcome should have been the same:           
[T]he staff, in a letter to Castle & Cooke . . . 
agreed with the company that a proposal 
requesting that it alter its food production 
methods in underdeveloped countries could 
be excluded under [the ordinary business 
exclusion] since [it] specified the steps 
management should take to implement the 
action requested . . . .  [Years later], 
however, the proponent instead asked the 
company to appoint a committee to review 
foreign agricultural operations with 
emphasis on the balance between labor and 
capital intensive production.  The staff 
refused to apply the rule to this provision 
because the appointment of a special 
committee to study the company’s foreign 
agricultural operations is a matter of policy.  
1982 Proposing Release, 1982 WL 600869, at *17 n.49 
(emphases added).  In the SEC’s view, a directive to Castle & 
Cooke to alter its food production methods in underdeveloped 
countries was the functional equivalent of a request for 
committee review of those methods.  See id.  Because the 
staff concurred that the former was excludable, it should have 
reached the same result as to the latter.  Thus, even though 
Trinity’s proposal asks for the development of a specific 
merchandising policy—and not a review, report or 
examination—we still ask whether the subject matter of the 
action it calls for is a matter of ordinary business.   
Applying that principle, we part ways with the District 
Court.  We perceive it put undue weight on the distinction 
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between a directive to management and a request for Board 
action.  In the District Court’s view, if the proposal had 
directed management to arrange its product assortment in a 
certain way, it would have been excludable.  But because it 
merely asked the “Board [to] oversee the development and 
effectuation of a Wal-Mart policy,” it was not.  Trinity, 2014 
WL 6790928, at *9 (emphasis and bold in original); see also 
id. (“Any direct impact of adoption of Trinity’s proposal 
would be felt at the Board level; it would then be for the 
Board to determine what, if any, policy should be formulated 
and implemented.”).  The concern with this line of reasoning 
is that the SEC in its 1976 Adopting Release rejected the 
proposed bright line whereby shareholder proposals involving 
“matters that would be handled by management personnel 
without referral to the board . . . generally would be 
excludable,” but those involving “matters that would require 
action by the board would not be.”  1976 Proposing Release, 
1976 WL 160410, at *8.  Thus, though the District Court’s 
rationale and holding are not implausible, we do not adopt 
them. 
Distancing itself from the District Court’s formal 
approach, Trinity argues that the subject matter of its proposal 
is the improvement of “corporate governance over strategic 
matters of community responsibility, reputation for good 
corporate citizenship, and brand reputation, none of which 
can be considered ordinary business,” Trinity Br. 39, and the 
focus is on the “shortcomings in Wal-Mart’s corporate 
governance and oversight over policy matters,” id. at 33.  We 
cannot agree.  As the National Association of Manufacturers 
points out, Trinity’s contention, like the District Court’s 
analysis, relies “on how [the proposal] is framed and to 
whom, rather than [its] substance.”  Brief of amicus curiae 
Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs. 15.  Contrary to what Trinity would 
have us believe, the immediate consequence of the adoption 
of a proposal—here the improvement of corporate 
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governance through the formulation and implementation of a 
merchandising policy—is not its subject matter.  If it were, 
then, analogizing to the review context, the subject matter of 
a review would be the review itself rather than the 
information sought by it.  See 1982 Proposing Release, 1982 
WL 600869, at *17.  For example, under Trinity’s position, 
the subject matter of a proposal that calls for a report on how 
a restaurant chain’s menu promotes sound dietary habits 
would be corporate governance as opposed to important 
matters involving the promotion of public health.  Yet that is 
the analysis the SEC disavowed in adopting the suggestions 
made in the 1982 Proposing Release.  The subject matter of 
the proposal is instead its ultimate consequence—here a 
potential change in the way Wal-Mart decides which products 
to sell.  Indeed, as even the District Court acknowledged, if 
the company were to adopt Trinity’s proposal, then, whatever 
the nature of the forthcoming policy, it “could (and almost 
certainly would) shape what products are sold by Wal-
Mart[.]”  Trinity, 2014 WL 6790928, at *9.       
This view of the subject matter of Trinity’s proposal 
finds support in a well-established line of SEC no-action 
letters.11  The most instructive is the no-action letter issued to 
                                              
11  Wal-Mart argues that although no-actions letters are 
generally not entitled to deference, the staff’s no-action letter 
here is because it is “consistent with both the SEC’s guidance 
on Rule 14a-8(i)(7) and the SEC staff’s prior no-action 
letters.”  Reply Br.13.  Although we disagree with the view 
that the letter holds any persuasive value, we do give the 
staff’s body of no-action letters “careful consideration as 
‘representing the views of persons who are continuously 
working with the provisions of the statute [the regulation in 
our case] involved.”  Donaghue v. Accenture Ltd., No. 03-
8329, 2004 WL 1823448, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2004) 
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Sempra Energy in January 2012.  The proposal there urged 
the Board “to conduct an independent oversight review each 
year of the Company’s management of political, legal, and 
financial risks posed by [its] operations in any country that 
may pose an elevated risk of corrupt practices.”  Sempra 
Energy, SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 6425347, at *2 
(Jan. 12, 2012).  As Trinity does here, the proposing 
shareholder framed the subject matter of its proposal as 
targeting the company’s governance of a certain type of risk: 
“the political, legal, and financial risks” inherent in the 
company’s operations in countries “posing an elevated risk of 
corrupt practices,” id., which could ultimately trigger a 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prosecution.  Cf. Trinity Br. 40 
(maintaining that its proposal addresses the governance of the 
“risks to society and Wal-Mart should a product, after it is 
sold, cause harm to [its] customers or its brand and 
reputation”) (quotation marks omitted).  But, as here, the staff 
granted no-action relief because, “although the proposal 
requests the board to conduct an independent oversight 
review of Sempra’s management of particular risks, the 
underlying subject matter of these risks appears to involve 
ordinary business matters.”  Sempra Energy, 2011 WL 
6425347, at *1; see also The Home Depot, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2008 WL 257307, at *1, *2 (Jan. 25, 2008) 
(granting no-action relief where the proposal asked Home 
Depot’s Board to publish a report outlining the company’s 
product safety policies and describing what management is 
                                                                                                     
(brackets, citation & quotation marks omitted); see also Nagy 
supra at 1002 (maintaining that whether “the staff has 
consistently maintained a particular regulatory interpretation 
in no-action letters over a long period of time is relevant” to 
whether the interpretation should merit some deference, as 
“consistent, longstanding staff positions may signal 
Commission approval of these positions”). 
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doing to address recent product safety concerns because it 
related to “Home Depot’s ordinary business operations (i.e., 
the sale of particular products)”); Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 3317923, at *1 (Nov. 6, 
2007) (same where proposal asked for a report “evaluating 
Company policies and procedures for systematically 
minimizing customers’ exposure to toxic substances and 
hazardous components in its marketed products” because it 
relates to Family Dollar’s “ordinary business operations (i.e., 
sale of particular products)”); Walgreen Co., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2006 WL 5381376, at *1 (Oct. 13, 2006) (same for 
proposal asking for a report  “characterizing the extent to 
which the company’s private label cosmetics and personal 
care products lines contain carcinogens, mutagens, 
reproductive toxicants, and chemicals that affect the 
endocrine system and describing options for using safer 
alternatives,” because the subject matter of the proposal 
related to Walgreen’s “ordinary business operations (i.e., the 
sale of particular products)”).12   
The staff’s consistent focus on the underlying subject 
matter of a proposal is instructive.  So too is Trinity’s failure 
to cite any authority for its view of the subject matter of its 
proposal.  See Trinity Br. 37–42.  For us, the subject matter of 
Trinity’s proposal is how Wal-Mart approaches 
                                              
12  In keeping with its emphasis on the subject matter of a 
proposal, the staff often denies no-action relief where the 
proposal merely calls for the Board to establish a committee 
to oversee risk generally.  See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2012 WL 542708, at *1 (Feb. 16, 2012) 
(denying no-action relief where the proposal merely asked the 
company to establish “a Risk Oversight Committee of the 
Board of Directors”).    
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merchandising decisions involving products that (1) 
especially endanger public-safety and well-being, (2) have the 
potential to impair the reputation of the Company, and/or (3) 
would reasonably be considered by many offensive to the 
family and community values integral to the company’s 
promotion of the brand.  A contrary holding—that the 
proposal’s subject matter is “improved corporate 
governance”—would allow drafters to evade Rule 14a-
8(i)(7)’s reach by styling their proposals as requesting board 
oversight or review.  See Reply Br. 10.  We decline to go in 
that direction.   
2. Does Wal-Mart’s approach to whether it sells 
particular products relate to its ordinary business 
operations? 
 Reaching the second step of the analysis, we ask 
whether the subject matter of Trinity’s proposal relates to 
day-to-day matters of Wal-Mart’s business.  Wal-Mart says 
the answer is yes because, even though the proposal doesn’t 
demand any specific changes to the make-up of its product 
offerings—a point on which Trinity hangs its hat, see Trinity 
Br. 38 (“[The proposal] is not a ‘stop selling’ proposal.  Nor 
does it require intricate reports on Wal-Mart’s products.”)—it 
“seeks to have a [B]oard committee address policies that 
could (and almost certainly would) shape what products are 
sold by Wal-Mart.”  Reply Br. 9 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  That is, Trinity’s proposal is just a sidestep from “a 
shareholder referendum on how [Wal-Mart] selects its 
inventory.”  Brief of amicus curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs. 
at 11.  And thus its subject matter strikes at the core of Wal-
Mart’s business.     
 
We agree.  A retailer’s approach to its product 
offerings is the bread and butter of its business.  As amicus 
the National Association of Manufacturers notes, “Product 
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selection is a complicated task influenced by economic 
trends, data analytics, demographics, customer preferences, 
supply chain flexibility, shipping costs and lead-times, and a 
host of other factors best left to companies’ management and 
boards of directors.”  Id. at 12; see also Brief of amicus 
curiae Retail Litig. Ctr., Inc. 11 (“The understanding of 
consumer behavior and careful tailoring of product mix is 
central to the success or failure of a given retailer.”).  Though 
a retailer’s merchandising approach is not beyond shareholder 
comprehension, the particulars of that approach involve 
operational judgments that are ordinary-course matters.   
 
Moreover, that the proposal doesn’t direct 
management to stop selling a particular product or prescribe a 
matrix to follow is, we think, a straw man.  See Trinity Br. 38; 
Trinity, 2014 WL 6790928, at *10 (“Trinity has carefully 
drafted its Proposal. . . . not [to] dictate which products 
should be sold or how the policies regarding sales of certain 
types of products should be formulated or implemented.”).  A 
proposal need only relate to a company’s ordinary business to 
be excludable.  Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (exclusion is 
proper where a proposal deals with a matter “relating to the 
company’s ordinary business operations”) (emphasis added).  
It need not dictate any particular outcome.  To make the point 
even clearer, suppose that Trinity’s proposal had merely 
asked Wal-Mart’s Board to reconsider whether to continue 
selling a given product.  Though the request doesn’t dictate a 
particular outcome, we have no doubt it would be excludable 
under the SEC’s 1983 Adopting Release, as the action sought 
relates to Wal-Mart’s ordinary business operations.  This is so 
even though it doesn’t suggest any changes.  The same is true 
here.  In short, so long as the subject matter of the proposal 
relates—that is, bears on—a company’s ordinary business 
operations, the proposal is excludable unless some other 
exception to the exclusion applies. 
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Failing all of this, Trinity retreats to friendlier territory.  
It contends that, even if the subject matter of its proposal 
concerns Wal-Mart’s ordinary business operations, it focuses 
on a significant and transcendent social policy issue: Wal-
Mart’s approach to the risk that the sale of a product can 
cause “harm to [its] customers or its brand and reputation.”  
Trinity Br. 40; see also id. at 44 (“There are various products 
especially dangerous to reputation, brand value, or the 
community that a family retailer such as Wal-Mart should 
carefully consider whether or not to sell, and the proposal 
addresses the transcendent policy issue of under what policies 
and standards and with what Board oversight Wal-Mart 
handles these merchandising decisions.”).  We address that 
issue next.   
 
B. Trinity’s Proposal Does Not Focus on a Significant 
Policy Issue that Transcends Wal-Mart’s Day-to-
Day Business Operations.   
 
As discussed above, there is a significant social policy 
exception to the default rule of excludability for proposals 
that relate to a company’s ordinary business operations.  For 
the SEC staff this means that when “a proposal’s underlying 
subject matter transcends the day-to-day business matters of 
the company and raises policy issues so significant that it 
would be appropriate for a shareholder vote, the proposal 
generally will not be excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).”  
SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E, 2009 WL 4363205, at *2 
(Oct. 27, 2009).        
 
The difficulty in this case is divining the line between 
proposals that focus on sufficiently significant social policy 
issues that transcend a company’s ordinary business (not 
excludable) from those that don’t (excludable).  Even the 
Commission admits that the social-policy exception “raise[s] 
difficult interpretive questions.”  1997 Proposing Release, 
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1997 WL 578696, at *13.  No doubt that is because the 
calculus is complex.  Yet we cannot sidestep what some may 
deem an unreckonable area.  Thus we wade in.   
 
We think the inquiry is again best split into two steps.  
The first is whether the proposal focuses on a significant 
policy (be it social or, as noted below, corporate).  If it 
doesn’t, the proposal fails to fit within the social-policy 
exception to Rule 14a-8(i)(7)’s exclusion.  If it does, we reach 
the second step and ask whether the significant policy issue 
transcends the company’s ordinary business operations.  
 
1. Does Trinity’s proposal raise a significant social 
policy issue?  
 
We first turn to whether Trinity’s proposal focuses on 
a “sufficiently significant” policy issue like “significant 
[employment] discrimination.”  1998 Adopting Release, 1998 
WL 254809, at *4.  The District Court said yes because the 
proposal at its core dealt with “the social and community 
effects of sales of high capacity firearms at the world’s largest 
retailer.”  Trinity, 2014 WL 6790928, at *9.  However, even 
Trinity concedes its proposal “is not directed solely to Wal-
Mart’s sale of guns.”  Trinity Mot. for Summ. J. 17 (ECF No. 
38, filed Jun. 18, 2014).  Rather it asks Wal-Mart’s Board to 
oversee merchandising decisions for all “products especially 
dangerous to reputation, brand value, or the community that a 
family retailer such as Wal-Mart should carefully consider 
whether or not to sell.”  Trinity Br. 44.  See also Brief of 
amici curiae Corporate and Securities Law Professors 14–15 
(arguing that the “ethical and social policy implications” of 
“[s]elling products that endanger public safety, Wal-Mart’s 
reputation, and [its] core values,” are “easily on par with 
employment discrimination, which the SEC’s 1998 Release 
deemed a sufficiently significant policy issue to warrant 
inclusion of shareholder proposals relating to it”).    
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 Wal-Mart, on the other hand, contends that neither the 
Commission nor its staff has ever countenanced “such a broad 
and nebulous concept of significant policy issue.”  Reply Br. 
21.  We disagree.  True enough, the Commission has adopted 
what can only be described as a “we-know-it-when-we-see-it” 
approach, see Palmiter at 910 (describing the Commission’s 
“shifting approach to social/political proposals” as the “most 
dramatic and prominent example of SEC inconstancy” under 
Rule 14a-8).  Yet it is hard to counter that Trinity’s proposal 
doesn’t touch the bases of what are significant concerns in 
our society and corporations in that society.  Thus we deem 
that its proposal raises a matter of sufficiently significant 
policy. 
 
Our concurring colleague, Judge Shwartz, would allow 
Wal-Mart to exclude Trinity’s proposal because it doesn’t 
focus on the retailer’s sale of guns with high-capacity 
magazines.  As she points out, it instead focuses on the 
broader issue of the company’s commitment to public safety 
through the sale of products that can be especially dangerous 
to the community.  Concurring Op. at 6–7  (“The ‘public 
safety’ component of the proposal could cover many 
products, especially in light of the amount of products Wal-
Mart offers, and thus might require [it] to develop policies 
and standards for thousands of goods.”).  And because this 
policy issue has the potential to bring “thousands” of products 
under its umbrella—not just guns with high-capacity 
magazines—it does not “as a whole ‘focus’” on a significant 
policy issue.  Id. at 7 (alterations omitted). 
 
Our colleague also believes that the second and third 
parts of Trinity’s proposal do not raise issues of significant 
import.  She claims that Wal-Mart’s management of risk to its 
brand value (the proposal’s second part) and its reputation as 
a family retailer (the third part) relate to matters that, “while 
certainly important to shareholders seeking a return on their 
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investment,” are “not of broad societal concern.”  Concurring 
Op. at 7.  Thus, she posits, these parts of the proposal relate to 
policy issues the exception doesn’t deem significant.  The 
trouble is the social-policy exception—despite its name—is 
not so limited. 
 
The good news is we come to the ultimate conclusion 
of Judge Shwartz—that Trinity’s proposal is excludable under 
the ordinary business bar—but take a different path.  We are 
more persuaded by the view that, because the proposal relates 
to a policy issue that targets the retailer-consumer interaction, 
it doesn’t raise an issue that transcends in this instance Wal-
Mart’s ordinary business operations, as product selection is 
the foundation of retail management.      
 
2. Even if Trinity’s proposal raises a significant 
policy issue, does that issue transcend Wal-
Mart’s ordinary business operations?  
To repeat, where “a proposal’s underlying subject 
matter transcends the day-to-day business matters of the 
company and raises policy issues so significant that it would 
be appropriate for a shareholder vote, the proposal generally 
will not be excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).”  SEC Staff 
Legal Bulletin No. 14E, 2009 WL 4363205, at *2 (Oct. 27, 
2009) (emphasis added).  What this means is that, to shield its 
proposal from the ordinary business exclusion, a shareholder 
must do more than focus its proposal on a significant policy 
issue; the subject matter of its proposal must “transcend” the 
company’s ordinary business.  See 1998 Adopting Release, 
1998 WL 254809, at *4.  The Commission used the latter 
term, we believe, to refer to a policy issue that is divorced 
from how a company approaches the nitty-gritty of its core 
business.  See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E, 2009 WL 
4363205, at *3 (maintaining that CEO succession-planning 
“raises a significant policy issue regarding the governance of 
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the corporation that transcends the day-to-day business matter 
of managing the workforce”).  Thus, and contrary to the 
position of our concurring colleague, we think the 
transcendence requirement plays a pivotal role in the social-
policy exception calculus.  Without it shareholders would be 
free to submit “proposals dealing with ordinary business 
matters yet cabined in social policy concern.”  Apache Corp. 
v. New York City Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 621 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 
n.7 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (rejecting the argument that “whether a 
proposal implicates significant social policy is the dispositive 
inquiry”).   
For major retailers of myriad products, a policy issue 
is rarely transcendent if it treads on the meat of 
management’s responsibility: crafting a product mix that 
satisfies consumer demand.  This explains why the 
Commission’s staff, almost as a matter of course, allows 
retailers to exclude proposals that “concern[] the sale of 
particular products and services.”  Rite Aid Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2015 WL 364996, at *1 (Mar. 24, 2015).  On 
the other hand, if a significant policy issue disengages from 
the core of a retailer’s business (deciding whether to sell 
certain goods that customers want), it is more likely to 
transcend its daily business dealings.   
 
To illustrate the distinction, a proposal that asks a 
supermarket chain to evaluate its sale of sugary sodas because 
of the effect on childhood obesity should be excludable 
because, although the proposal raises a significant social 
policy issue, the request is too entwined with the 
fundamentals of the daily activities of a supermarket running 
its business: deciding which food products will occupy its 
shelves.  So too would a proposal that, out of concern for 
animal welfare, aims to limit which food items a grocer sells.  
Cf., e.g., Amazon.com, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 
470145, at *1 (Mar. 27, 2015) (allowing Amazon to exclude 
52 
 
proposal that asked it to “disclose to shareholders any 
reputational and financial risks that it may face as a result of 
negative public opinion pertaining to the treatment of 
animals used to produce products it sells” because the 
“proposal relates to the products and services offered for sale 
by the company”); Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2014 WL 7406254, at *1 (Feb. 13, 2015) (same for 
proposal that encouraged the pizza franchise to “expand its 
menu offerings to include vegan cheeses and vegan meats in 
order to advance animal welfare, reduce its ecological 
footprint, expand its healthier options and meet growing 
demand for plant-based foods”).   
 
By contrast, a proposal raising the impropriety of a 
supermarket’s discriminatory hiring or compensation 
practices generally is not excludable because, even though 
human resources management is a core business function, it is 
disengaged from the essence of a supermarket’s business.  
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 
326494, at *1 (Feb. 17, 2004) (denying no-action relief where 
proposal asked for a report documenting “the distribution of 
[] equity compensation by the recipient’s race and gender and 
discuss[ing] recent trends in equity compensation granted to 
women and employees of color”).  The same goes for 
proposals asking for information on the environmental effect 
of constructing stores near environmentally sensitive sites.  
See, e.g., Jenny Staletovich, Developer Defends Walmart in 
Rare Forest, The Miami Herald (Sept. 12, 2014), available at 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/environment/article
2092364.html.13  
                                              
13  Our concurring colleague says our suggested test is 
untenable for deciding whether a proposal fits within the 
social-policy exception because she believes our test requires 
that a proposal be “completely” divorced from a company’s 
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With those principles in mind, we turn to Trinity’s 
proposal.  Trinity says it focuses on “both corporate policy 
and social policy”—specifically, the “transcendent policy 
issue of under what policies and standards and with what 
Board oversight Wal-Mart handles [] merchandising 
decisions” for products that are “especially dangerous to [the 
company’s] reputation, brand value, or the community.”  
Trinity Br. 44 (emphasis in original).  “In an age of mass 
shootings, increased violence, and concerns about product 
safety,” Trinity argues, “the [p]roposal goes to the heart of 
Wal-Mart’s impact on and approach to social welfare as well 
as the risks such impact and approach may have to Wal-
Mart’s reputation and brand image and its community.”  Id. at 
43.   
   
But is how a retailer weighs safety in deciding which 
products to sell too enmeshed with its day-to-day business?  
We think it is in this instance.  As we noted before, the 
essence of a retailer’s business is deciding what products to 
put on its shelves—decisions made daily that involve a 
careful balancing of financial, marketing, reputational, 
competitive and other factors.  The emphasis management 
places on safety to the consumer or the community is 
fundamental to its role in managing the company in the best 
interests of its shareholders and cannot, “as a practical matter, 
be subject to direct shareholder oversight.”  1998 Adopting 
                                                                                                     
ordinary business.  Concurring Op. at 3.  Nowhere do we 
suggest that to come within the exception a proposal must 
raise a policy issue that is completely unrelated to a day-to-
day business matter.  If that were so, then a proposal relating 
to a retailer’s discriminatory hiring practices would be 
excludable, as hiring is a fundamental business decision.  We 
agree with the Commission that such a proposal is not 
excludable.     
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Release, 1998 WL 254809, at *4.  Although shareholders 
perform a valuable service by creating awareness of social 
issues, they are not well-positioned to opine on basic business 
choices made by management.    
 
It is thus not surprising that the Corp. Fin. staff 
consistently allows retailers to omit proposals that address 
their product menu.  For example, it has indicated that a 
proposal trying to stop a retailer from selling or promoting 
products that connote negative stereotypes is excludable.  See, 
e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2002 WL 975596, at *13 (Mar. 27, 2002) (allowing the 
retailer to omit a proposal asking for a report on its “efforts to 
identify and disassociate from any offensive imagery to the 
American Indian community in products, adverting [sic], 
endorsements, sponsorships and promotions”).  It has done 
the same for proposals aiming to restrict a retailer’s 
promotion of products that pose a threat to public health, see 
e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 
833445, at *1 (Apr. 1, 2002) (agreeing with Wal-Mart that it 
could exclude a proposal asking it to explain “its rationale for 
not adopting in developing nations the same policies 
restricting the promotion and marketing of tobacco products 
as in the United States”); Walgreen Co., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2006 WL 5381376, at *1–2 (Oct. 13, 2006) (same for 
proposal asking for a report regarding “the extent to which 
the company’s private label cosmetics and personal care 
product lines contain carcinogens, mutagens, reproductive 
toxicants, and chemicals that affect the endocrine system”), as 
well as those proposals targeting a retailer’s approach to 
product safety.  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2008 WL 670182, at *1 (Mar. 11, 2008) (Wal-
Mart may exclude a proposal requesting a “report on the 
company’s policies on nanomaterial product safety”); The 
Home Depot, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 257300, 
at *2 (allowing company to exclude a proposal encouraging it 
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“to end its sale of glue traps because they are cruel and 
inhumane to the target animals and pose a danger to 
companion animals and wildlife”); The Home Depot, Inc., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 257307, at *7 (same for 
proposal asking for an “evaluation of company policies and 
practices relating to product safety”).      
 
For further support of the view that a policy issue does 
not transcend a company’s ordinary business operations 
where it targets day-to-day decision-making, we look to the 
difference in treatment of stop-selling proposals sent to 
retailers and those sent to pure-play manufacturers.  A policy 
matter relating to a product is far more likely to transcend a 
company’s ordinary business operations when the product is 
that of a manufacturer with a narrow line.  Here the staff often 
will decline a no-action request.  See, e.g., Phillip Morris 
Companies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286063, at 
*1 (Feb. 22, 1990) (denying no-action relief as to proposal 
that requests the Board to amend the company’s charter to 
provide that it “shall not conduct any business in tobacco or 
tobacco products”); Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2001 WL 258493, at *1 (Mar. 5, 2001) (same 
where proposal asks the Board to provide a report on 
company policies and procedures focused on reducing gun 
violence in the United States).  
 
 But the outcome changes where those same policy 
proposals are directed at retailers who sell thousands of 
products.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2001 WL 253625, at *6 (Mar. 9, 2001) (allowing Wal-Mart to 
exclude a proposal aimed at stopping its sale of handguns and 
accompanying ammunition[] in any way (e.g. by special 
order)” because it relates to “Wal-Mart’s ordinary business 
operations (i.e., the sale of a particular product)”); see also 
Rite Aid Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 829472, at 
*1 (Mar. 26, 2009) (same for proposal asking for a report on 
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the company’s response “to rising regulatory, competitive and 
public pressures to halt sales of tobacco products”); Walgreen 
Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 599903, at *1 (Sept. 
29, 1997) (same for proposal requesting that Walgreen stop 
the sale of tobacco in its stores, as it “is directed at matters 
relating to the conduct of the Company’s ordinary business 
operations (i.e., the sale of a particular product)”).    
          
The reason for the difference, in our view, is that a 
manufacturer with a very narrow product focus—like a 
tobacco or gun manufacturer—exists principally to sell the 
product it manufactures.  Its daily business deliberations do 
not involve whether to continue to sell the product to which it 
owes its reason for being.  As such, a stop-selling proposal 
generally isn’t excludable because it relates to the seller’s 
very existence.  Quite the contrary for retailers.  They 
typically deal with thousands of products amid many options 
for each, precisely the sort of business decisions a retailer 
makes many times daily.  Thus, and in contrast to the 
manufacturing context, a stop-selling proposal implicates a 
retailer’s ordinary business operations and is in turn 
excludable.  Although Trinity’s proposal is not strictly a stop-
selling proposal, it still targets the same basic business 
decision: how to weigh safety risks in the merchandising 
calculus.14   
                                              
14  We recognize that in “extrapolat[ing] an interpretive 
rationale from a [line of] [] no-action letter[s], [we] risk[] 
setting a legal precedent based on a rationale that the SEC 
never in fact advocated.”  Nagy at 1006.  Fortunately, our 
word is not the last.  If our interpretation is flawed, the 
Commission can issue new (binding) interpretative guidance 
to correct us.  Cf. Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., LLC, 544 F.3d 
493, 502 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that a court of appeals is 
not free to ignore the SEC’s interpretation of one of its 
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      Trinity’s claim that its proposal raises a 
“significant” and “transcendent” corporate policy is likewise 
insufficient to fit that proposal within the social-policy 
exception to exclusion.  See Trinity Br. 47.  The relevant 
question to us is whether Wal-Mart’s consideration of the risk 
that certain products pose to its “economic success” and 
“reputation for good corporate citizenship” is enmeshed with 
the way it runs its business and the retailer-consumer 
interaction.  We think the answer is yes.  Decisions relating to 
what products Wal-Mart sells in its rural locations versus its 
urban sites will vary considerably, and these are 
quintessentially calls made by management.  Wal-Mart serves 
different Americas with different values.  Its customers in 
rural America want different products than its customers in 
cities, and that management decides how to deal with these 
differing desires is not an issue typical for its Board of 
Directors.  Indeed, catering to “small-town America” is how 
Wal-Mart built its business.  See Sam Walton, SAM WALTON: 
MADE IN AMERICA 50 (1993) (“It turned out that the first big 
lesson we learned was that there was much, much more 
business out there in small-town America than anybody, 
including me, had ever dreamed of.”).  And whether to put 
emphasis on brand integrity and brand protection, or none at 
all, is naturally a decision shareholders as well as directors 
entrust management to make in the exercise of their 
experience and business judgment.   
 
We also agree with Wal-Mart’s contention (and 
seemingly the position of the Corp. Fin. staff) that a company 
                                                                                                     
ambiguous rules even where the court of appeals had 
previously interpreted the rule and its interpretation is at odds 
with that of the Commission) (citing Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 976 
(2005)).    
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can omit a shareholder proposal concerning its reputation or 
brand when what the proposal seeks is woven with the way 
the company conducts its business.  Cf. FedEx Corp., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 2358714, at *1 (July 11, 2014) 
(allowing FedEx to omit a proposal that asked for a report 
addressing how the company “can better respond to 
reputational damage from its association with the Washington 
D.C. NFL franchise team name controversy” because it 
“relates to the manner in which FedEx advertises its products 
and services”); see also Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 6723114, at *1 (Feb. 6, 2013) 
(same for proposal asking the Board to prepare a report on, 
among other things, “the reputational risks associated with the 
setting of unfair, inequitable and excessive rent increases that 
cause undue hardship to older homeowners on fixed 
incomes,” as “the setting of prices for products and services is 
fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on a 
day-to-day basis”); Bank of America Corp., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2010 WL 4922465, at *1 (Feb. 24, 2010) (same for 
proposal asking Bank of America’s Board to publish a report 
describing the bank’s policy regarding the “funding of 
companies engaged predominantly in mountain top removal 
coal mining and an assessment of the policy’s efficacy in 
reducing [greenhouse gas] emissions and in protecting [its] 
reputation,” as it “addresses matters beyond the 
environmental impact of [its] project finance decisions, such 
as [its] decisions to extend credit or provide other financial 
services to particular types of customers”); Dean Foods Co., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 754960, at *1 (Mar. 9, 
2007) (same for proposal requesting that an independent 
committee of the Board “review the company’s policies and 
procedures for its organic dairy products and report to 
shareholders on the adequacy of the policies and procedures 
to protect the company’s brands and reputation and address 
consumer and media criticism,” because this concerns the 
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company’s “ordinary business operations (i.e., customer 
relations and decisions relating to supplier relationships)”). 
 
We thus hold that, even if Trinity’s proposal raises 
sufficiently significant social and corporate policy issues, 
those policies do not transcend the ordinary business 
operations of Wal-Mart.  For a policy issue here to transcend 
Wal-Mart’s business operations, it must target something 
more than the choosing of one among tens of thousands of 
products it sells.  Trinity’s proposal fails that test and is 
properly excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(7). 
V. CONCLUSION 
  Although a core business of courts is to interpret 
statutes and rules, our job is made difficult where agencies, 
after notice and comment, have hard-to-define exclusions to 
their rules and exceptions to those exclusions.  For those who 
labor with the ordinary business exclusion and a social-policy 
exception that requires not only significance but 
“transcendence,” we empathize.  Despite the substantial 
uptick in proposals attempting to raise social policy issues 
that bat down the business operations bar, the SEC’s last 
word on the subject came in the 1990s, and we have no hint 
that any change from it or Congress is forthcoming.  As one 
former SEC commissioner has opined, “it is neither fair nor 
reasonable to expect securities experts [like the Commission 
and its staff] to deduce the prevailing wind on public policy 
issues that have yet to be addressed by Congress in any 
decisive fashion.”  Commissioner Criticizes Subjectivity, 
Inconsistency in SEC Review of Proposals, BNA Corp. 
Couns. Wkly., 2-3 (Mar. 31, 1993) (quoting remarks of 
Comm. Richard Y. Roberts).  That remains true today.   
We have no doubt that the Commission is equipped to 
collect “relevant data and views regarding the best direction 
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for its regulatory policy.”  Nagy at 993.  We thus suggest that 
it consider revising its regulation of proxy contests and issue 
fresh interpretive guidance.  In the meantime, we hold here 
that Trinity’s proposal is excludable from Wal-Mart’s proxy 
materials under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).   
1 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, with whom Judge VANASKIE 
joins as to Part III, concurring in the judgment. 
 
 I agree with the Majority that Wal-Mart may omit 
Trinity’s proposal from the company’s proxy materials.  I 
write separately, however, for two reasons.  First, while I 
agree with my colleagues that the proposal is excludable 
based on the ordinary business exclusion, I believe that the 
test that it has fashioned for determining when an exception 
to this exclusion applies may remove many company actions 
over which shareholders should have a say from shareholder 
oversight.  Second, I write to explain that both the ordinary 
business and the vagueness exclusions support exclusion of 
the entire proposal.1  
 
I 
 
 SEC Rule 14a-8 requires a public company to include 
a shareholder proposal “in its proxy statement . . . when [the 
company] holds an annual or special meeting of 
shareholders,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8, in recognition of the 
fact that, “with the increased dispersion of security holdings 
in public companies, the proxy solicitation process rather than 
the shareholder’s meeting itself ha[s] become the forum for 
shareholder suffrage,” Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8, 
Exchange Act Release No. 19135, 1982 WL 600869, at *2 
(Oct. 14, 1982) (the “1982 Proposing Release”). The rule thus 
                                              
 1Trinity declined to omit any component of the 
proposal, Tr. of Oral Arg. at 39-40, and thus sought approval 
of the proposal in its entirety.   Accordingly, each component 
of the proposal must be nonexcludable for it to comply with 
SEC Rule 14a-8.   
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“affords shareholders access to management proxy 
solicitations,” both “to sound out management views and to 
communicate with other shareholders on matters of major 
import.”  Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration 
omitted).  Such access, however, is not unfettered.  In 
addition to eligibility and procedural requirements, SEC Rule 
14a-8 is “limited by thirteen content-based exceptions,” id., 
two of which Wal-Mart argues apply here: Rule 14a-8(i)(7) 
and Rule 14a-8(i)(3). 
 
 Rule 14a-8(i)(7) allows a company to exclude 
proposals that “deal[] with a matter relating to the company’s 
ordinary business operations.”  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).  
The SEC has explained that the determination of whether a 
particular shareholder proposal implicates a company’s 
ordinary business operations “rests on two central 
considerations”: (1) whether the “subject matter” of the 
proposal involves “tasks . . . fundamental to management’s 
ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis”; and (2) “the 
degree to which the proposal seeks to ‘micro-manage’ the 
company by probing too deeply into matters of a complex 
nature upon which shareholders . . . would not be in a position 
to make an informed judgment.”  Amendments to Rules on 
Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 23200, 1998 WL 254809, 
at *4-5 (May 21, 1998) (“1998 Adopting Release”).   
 
 There is an exception to this exclusion.  Specifically, 
proposals “relating to” ordinary business operations “but 
focusing on sufficiently significant social policy issues . . . 
generally would not be considered excludable,” 
notwithstanding their relationship to ordinary business, 
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“because the proposals would transcend the day-to-day 
business matters and raise policy issues so significant that it 
would be appropriate for a shareholder vote.”  Id. at *4.  The 
Majority would limit proposals invoking the “significant 
social policy exception” to only those concerning matters that 
are “disengaged from the essence of” a company’s business, 
Maj. Op. at 52, and reads the 1998 Adopting Release to 
require a proposal that focuses on a significant social policy 
issue to be completely “divorced from how a company 
approaches the nitty-gritty of its core business,” Maj. Op. at 
50; see also id. (“[T]o shield its proposal from the ordinary 
business exclusion, a shareholder must do more than focus its 
proposal on a significant policy issue; the subject matter of its 
proposal must ‘transcend’ the company’s ordinary 
business.”).  In my view, this reading is inconsistent with the 
plain text of the 1998 Adopting Release.    
 
The 1998 Adopting Release provides that, to avoid 
running afoul of the ordinary business exclusion, a proposal 
“relating to” a company’s ordinary business must “focus[] 
on” a “sufficiently significant social policy issue.”  1998 
Adopting Release, 1998 WL 254809, at *4.  If it does, “it 
generally would not be considered excludable, because the 
proposal[] would transcend . . . day-to-day business matters.”  
Id.  As this passage makes clear, whether a proposal focuses 
on an issue of social policy that is sufficiently significant is 
not separate and distinct from whether the proposal 
transcends a company’s ordinary business.  Rather, a proposal 
is sufficiently significant “because” it transcends day-to-day 
business matters.  Id.  Thus, the SEC treats the significance 
and transcendence concepts as interrelated, rather than 
independent. 
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The 1998 Adopting Release also does not require that 
a proposal be “disengaged from the essence of” a company’s 
business, Maj. Op. at 52, such that a company is insulated 
from any submission relating to the “crafting [of] a product 
mix that satisfies consumer demand,” Maj. Op. at 51.  Indeed, 
the 1998 Adopting Release expressly permits a shareholder to 
submit a proposal that relates directly to ordinary business 
matters, including “decisions on production quality and 
quantity, and the retention of suppliers,” so long as it 
“focus[es] on” an issue of “sufficiently significant social 
policy.”  1998 Adopting Release, 1998 WL 254809, at *4 
(acknowledging that “[c]ertain tasks,” including those related 
to production and suppliers, “are so fundamental to 
management’s ability to run a company on a day-to-day 
basis” that they are not “subject to direct shareholder 
oversight,” but recognizing that “proposals relating to such 
matters but focusing on sufficiently significant social policy 
issues” generally are not excludable).  Thus, to “transcend” 
ordinary business, as that term is used in the 1998 Adopting 
Release, a proposal need not be divorced from ordinary 
business, as the Majority proposes, but instead must focus on 
a policy issue that in some “transcend[ent]” way trumps 
ordinary business in importance.  See id.; see also Adoption 
of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 
Release No. 12999, 1976 WL 160347, at *11 (Nov. 22, 1976) 
(noting that proposals including “certain matters which have 
significant policy, economic, or other implications,” like “the 
economic and safety considerations attendant to nu[cl]ear 
power plants,” are “of such magnitude” that they should be 
“considered beyond the realm of an issuer’s ordinary business 
operations,” despite their relationship to such operations). 
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 In addition to conflicting with SEC guidance, the 
Majority’s test for the “significant social policy exception” to 
the ordinary business exclusion is inconsistent with the 
purpose of § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (the “Exchange Act”), and Rule 14a-8.  
When Congress enacted the Exchange Act, it sought to ensure 
“fair corporate suffrage.”  J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 
426, 432 (1964).  One way such suffrage is protected is 
through accurate proxy solicitations.  Id.  Congress authorized 
the SEC to generate rules that would advance this goal.  See 
15 U.S.C. § 78n.  To this end, it promulgated Rule 14 to 
provide guidelines for shareholder proposals, including those 
that raise social issues.  As the Commission noted in the 1998 
Adopting Release, “shareholder proposals on social issues 
may improve investor confidence in the securities markets by 
providing investors with a sense that as shareholders they 
have a means to express their views to the management of the 
companies in which they invest.”  1998 Adopting Release, 
1998 WL 254809, at *19. 
 
 The Majority’s test, insofar as it practically gives 
companies carte blanche to exclude any proposal raising 
social policy issues that are directly related to core business 
operations, undermines the principle of fair corporate suffrage 
animating Rule 14a-8: shareholders’ “ability to exercise their 
right—some would say their duty—to control the important 
decisions which affect them in their capacity as . . . owners of 
[a] corporation.”  Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 
432 F.3d 659, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted).  
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act ensures that “[a] 
corporation is run for the benefit of its stockholders and not 
for that of its managers,” SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 
F.2d 511, 517 (3d Cir. 1947), and “Congress intended by its 
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enactment of [§] 14 . . . to give true vitality to the concept of 
corporate democracy,” Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 432 
F.3d at 676.  Permitting shareholders to vote on important 
social issues, including those that may be closely related to a 
company’s ordinary business, is consistent with these 
principles, and I would not interpret the ordinary business 
exclusion to prohibit it. 
 
II 
 
 All that said, Trinity’s proposal as written is 
excludable under the ordinary business exclusion because it 
lacks the focus needed to trigger the “significant social 
policy” exception.  To qualify for this exception, Trinity’s 
proposal must focus on a significant policy issue.  Trinity’s 
proposal asks the Board to amend the Committee charter to 
require that it create policies and standards for determining 
whether Wal-Mart should sell a product that: (1) “especially 
endangers public safety and well-being”; (2) “has the 
substantial potential to impair” Wal-Mart’s reputation; and/or 
(3) “would reasonably be considered by many to be offensive 
to the family and community values integral to” Wal-Mart’s 
brand.  J.A. 268.  Although the proposal states that it is for 
“determining whether or not [Wal-Mart] should sell guns 
equipped with magazines holding more than ten rounds of 
ammunition . . . and [for] balancing the benefits of selling 
such guns against the risk that these sales pose to the public 
and to [Wal-Mart’s] reputation and brand value,” J.A. 268, 
the full text shows that it is not directed solely to Wal-Mart’s 
sale of guns.   
 
The proposal has three separate components.  The 
“public safety” component of the proposal could cover many 
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products, especially in light of the amount of products Wal-
Mart offers, and thus might require Wal-Mart to develop 
policies and standards for thousands of goods.  While Wal-
Mart’s sale of guns with high-capacity magazines may raise a 
significant social policy issue concerning public safety, not all 
products that may fall within the proposal do so.  Thus, while 
the first component of Trinity’s proposal may raise a 
significant issue of social policy, insofar as it touches on the 
sale of guns equipped with high capacity magazines, we 
cannot say that the proposal as a whole  “focus[es] on” such 
an issue.  1998 Adopting Release, 1998 WL 254809, at *4.  
Accordingly, Trinity may not avail itself of the “significant 
social policy exception” to the ordinary business exclusion.  
 
 Similarly, the second and third components of the 
proposal could cover many products.  They are also 
problematic for other reasons.  The second component seeks 
standards for determining whether Wal-Mart should sell a 
product that may impair the company’s reputation.  How 
Wal-Mart would like others to view it is a unique company 
interest, and while certainly important to shareholders seeking 
a return on their investment, it is not of broad societal 
concern.  The third component, which asks the Board to 
consider whether the sale of a product would impact its brand, 
also focuses on matters of interest to the company but not 
society at large.  Thus, these components cover matters 
relating to Wal-Mart’s ordinary business operations, do not 
present a social policy issue, and render the entire proposal 
excludable.   
 
III 
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There is an additional problem with the third 
component of the proposal: it is vague and thus excludable 
under Rule 14a-8(i)(3).  Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits a company 
to exclude shareholder proposals that are “so vague and 
ambiguous that the issuer and security holders would not be 
able to determine what action the proposal is contemplating,” 
1982 Proposing Release, 1982 WL 600869, at *13.  The 
rationale for excluding a shareholder proposal that is “vague 
and ambiguous” is twofold: (1) shareholders are entitled to 
know the breadth of the proposal on which they are asked to 
vote; and (2) the company must be able to comprehend what 
actions or measures the proposal requires of it.  See Dyer v. 
SEC, 287 F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 1961); N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. 
Sys. v. Brunswick, 789 F. Supp. 144, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 
As previously stated, the third component of the 
proposal that asks the Committee to formulate policies and 
standards for the sale of products that “would reasonably be 
considered by many to be offensive to the family and 
community values integral to” Wal-Mart’s brand.  J.A. 268.  
While Trinity argues that this component simply asks the 
Committee to consider whether a product may negatively 
impact its brand, the proposal, as written, measures that 
impact based upon what “many” view as “offensive” to 
“family and community values.”  Trinity attempts to link 
these terms back to what Wal-Mart has said about its values, 
including the “Save Money, Live Better” tag line, but these 
buzz words fail to provide any concrete guidance as to what 
constitutes “many” or what “family values” should be 
considered.  Thus, this component of the proposal does not 
inform the shareholders of the breadth of the subject on which 
they would be asked to vote nor does it make clear what the 
Company would be required to do if it were adopted.  For this 
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reason, the proposal is also excludable under Rule 14a-
8(i)(3). 
 
IV 
  
 I therefore concur in the judgment. 
